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EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AND THE 
SAAMCO PRINCIPLE 
 
 When things go wrong in property transactions, solicitors tend to make 
obvious and attractive defendants. They are insured and can provide substantial 
monetary redress. Moreover, they may well have held deposits or mortgage 
monies on trust. This opens up the possibility of claims for breach of trust. Such 
claims continue to prove popular; unlike claims in negligence, liability for 
breach of trust is strict and the onus is shifted onto the trustees to prove that 
their conduct was honest and reasonable and that they ought fairly to be excused 
from liability for breach of trust (see Trustee Act 1925, section 61). But a 
crucial question is whether the remedies for breach of trust are more generous to 
claimants than those in tort or contract. The decisions of the House of Lords in 
Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] A.C. 421 and the Supreme Court in AIB 
Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co [2014] UKSC 58; [2015] A.C. 1503 
suggest not, at least where the trust relationship between claimant and defendant 
arises as an incident of a contractual arrangement. A similar approach was 
ostensibly adopted by the Court of Appeal in the recent decision of Main v 
Giambrone & Law (a firm) [2017] EWCA Civ 1193, but the result of the case is 
more generous to the claimants than that reached in Target and AIB. It is 
unclear whether Target and AIB can be satisfactorily distinguished on their 
facts. The Court of Appeal also applied the SAAMCO principle regarding 
“scope of duty” to equitable compensation for the first time. This development 
was perhaps predictable in the wake of AIB, but deserves critical attention.  
Two Italian companies planned to build luxury apartments in Southern 
Italy. The apartments were sold “off-plan” as holiday homes to people living in 
the UK and Ireland. Unfortunately, only a very small number of apartments 
were completed and conveyed to purchasers. There are currently investigations 
into allegations that the whole project was a money laundering operation 
organised by the IRA and Italian Mafia. Most disappointed purchasers 
rescinded their contracts of purchase but were unable to recover their deposits. 
They sought redress against their solicitors, Giambrone, a firm of Italian 
lawyers practising in London and Italy to whom the developers referred 
prospective purchasers. Once purchasers had paid an initial deposit of €3,000, 
they were sent a retainer letter by Giambrone. After signing preliminary 
contracts, the purchasers then transferred to Giambrone deposits ranging 
between £30,000 and £105,000. Giambrone held the deposits on trust, with the 
authority to release them upon the issue of a bank loan guarantee in compliance 
with Italian Decree 122/05. Giambrone wrongly released the deposit monies 
without such guarantees being in place: Decree 122/05 required a guarantee to 
be issued by a financial institution listed in Article 107 of the Consolidated Law 
on Banking and Credit, but Giambrone released the deposit monies upon receipt 
of guarantees from institutions listed in Article 106. The institutions listed in 
Article 106 were not as strong as those listed in Article 107. The unauthorised 
misapplication of trust monies by Giambrone constituted breaches of trust. 
 The Court of Appeal had to decide what remedy should be awarded 
following Giambrone’s breaches of trust. (For reasons of space, further 
discussion of the nature of the breaches of duty committed by Giambrone is not 
possible in this note.) Before Target Holdings, the purchasers would have been 
able to take an account of the trust fund, falsify the wrongful disbursement and 
recover the amount of the misapplied deposits from their solicitor-trustees. But 
in the wake of Target Holdings and AIB, the focus is now on “equitable 
compensation” and the loss caused to a beneficiary by a breach of trust. 
Giambrone argued that this meant that the purchasers should not receive any 
compensation, since the events in Italy did not (somewhat oddly) trigger the 
obligation of the guarantors to pay out (at [47]), so even if an Article 107 
guarantee had been obtained the claimants would still have lost their deposits. 
In other words, it did not matter to the purchasers’ ultimate financial position 
that the guarantee was issued by an institution listed in Article 106 rather than 
Article 107. 
 The Court of Appeal held that the purchasers could recover the value of 
their lost deposits. Jackson L.J., who gave the leading judgment, thought that 
three key authorities needed to be considered: Canson Enterprises Ltd v 
Boughton & Co (1991) 85 DLR (4th) 129, Target, and AIB. Although the 
decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Canson was thought to be helpful 
by the House of Lords in Target and Supreme Court in AIB, it is worth 
highlighting once more that Canson did not concern a breach of trust, but rather 
breach of duty by a fiduciary who was not a trustee. The fiduciary did not owe 
custodial duties regarding the claimant’s property. The continued muddling of 
claims for breach of trust and claims for breach of fiduciary duty undermines 
confidence in the reasoning of the courts. Target and AIB, on the other hand, 
were directly on point and are worth outlining briefly. 
 In Target, Redferns was a firm of solicitors acting for both the borrowers 
and the lender, Target Holdings (“Target”). Redferns held the mortgage advance 
of around £1.5 million on a bare trust for Target, with authority to release the 
money to the borrowers only upon receipt of the executed conveyance and 
mortgage of the property. In breach of trust, Redferns released the money before 
the documents were executed. The property was in due course found to be 
worth only £500,000. However, soon after the breach of trust the relevant 
mortgage documents were executed and received by Redferns. The House of 
Lords held that the solicitors would only be liable if Target could prove that its 
loss would not have occurred but for the early payment of the money without 
taking any security.  
 In AIB, Mark Redler & Co (“Redler”) was a firm of solicitors which was 
retained to act for the Sondhi family and AIB, a Bank, on the re-mortgage of the 
Sondhis’ family home. AIB advanced £3.3 million to Redler for this purpose. 
The mortgage monies were only to be released in exchange for a fully 
enforceable first legal charge over the property, but in breach of trust Redler 
advanced the monies without fully redeeming a first legal charge over the 
property already held by Barclays. Barclays therefore retained a first legal 
charge over the property of around £300,000. The Supreme Court refused to 
order that Redler reconstitute the trust fund to the tune of £3.3 million. AIB 
could only recover the loss it had suffered as a result of the breach of trust: 
£300,000. 
 Giambrone seems remarkably similar to these cases. Even if Giambrone 
had received valid guarantees in accordance with Decree 122/05, then the 
purchasers would still have lost their deposits; Giambrone argued, therefore, 
that no substantial remedy should be ordered. But the Court of Appeal held that 
Target and AIB could be distinguished. Jackson L.J. said (at [60]-[61]) that the 
“essential difference between this case and Target or AIB is the solicitors’ role 
in relation to the security. … Giambrone’s role was to receive whatever 
guarantees the developers provided and to check whether or not they complied 
with Decree 122. … The position was different in Target and AIB. In Target the 
solicitors were under a duty to take active steps to secure a charge over the 
property, before releasing the monies. In AIB the solicitors were under a duty to 
take active steps to secure the removal of prior charges before releasing the 
money.” 
 This distinction is novel, and may be an initial move to try to restrict the 
scope of AIB. That decision departed from previous orthodoxy in rather brusque 
fashion based upon somewhat unsatisfactory reasoning that should perhaps be 
revisited by the Supreme Court (see e.g. Davies (2015) 78 M.L.R. 672). In any 
event, on the facts of the cases, it is not clear that the solicitors in Target, for 
example, were under “a duty to take active steps”. If valid charges could not be 
granted, then the solicitors would not have been under an “active duty” to do 
anything further. But even if this factual distinction were to be accepted, it is not 
clear why it should make a difference to the remedies awarded.  
 Jackson L.J. thought that Giambrone’s duty was “an obligation to act as 
custodians of the deposit monies indefinitely” (at [62]), and this more passive 
duty could be contrasted with the active duty owed in Target and AIB. 
However, this distinction is very thin indeed: in both Target and AIB the duty of 
the trustees was to act as custodians of the mortgage monies too. The judgment 
of the Court of Appeal may well encourage claimants to argue that the trustees 
should simply have remained as custodians in order to obtain more generous 
relief, but courts are likely to struggle simultaneously to apply such a test and 
distinguish Target and AIB. It is unclear why the “active duty” present in Target 
and AIB should swallow up and effectively render redundant the “custodial 
duty” owed by the trustees. 
  Jackson L.J. also distinguished Target and AIB since on the facts of 
Giambrone there was a causal link between the breach of trust and the loss of 
the deposits, unlike in the earlier cases. His Lordship observed – consistently 
with the guidance from the Supreme Court – that “equitable compensation and 
contractual damages run in tandem” (at [63]). But it is not clear that the 
contractual measure of damages would cover all the loss suffered. That depends 
on what would have happened if Giambrone had not paid the money away 
without a guarantee compliant with Decree 122/05. If no compliant guarantee 
would have been received, then the result seems correct since Giambrone 
should have had the deposit monies. But if Giambrone would have received a 
compliant guarantee, then no loss would have been caused by the breach; the 
case is then similar to Target and AIB. Unfortunately, no finding of fact in this 
respect seems to have been made by the trial judge, who appeared to agree with 
the claimants that, unlike for claims in tort or contract, “it was not necessary to 
demonstrate that an individual Claimant would not have proceeded with a 
purchase where breach of trust was relied upon” ([2015] EWHC 3315 (QB) at 
[17]).  
In Target (at 436) Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: “I have no doubt that, 
until the underlying commercial transaction has been completed, the solicitor 
can be required to restore to client account moneys wrongly paid away”. In AIB, 
the Supreme Court held that the underlying transaction had been completed “as 
a commercial matter”, even though the requisite first legal charge was never 
obtained, because the relationship between the borrowers and the bank became 
one of contractual borrower and lender (see e.g., AIB at [74]). It may be that in 
Giambrone the Court of Appeal did not think that the commercial transaction 
was completed because the proper guarantees were not received. This strict 
approach to completion would be attractive since it enables the parties to dictate 
precisely what constitutes “completion”. However, it would also cast some 
doubt upon the lax test of the Supreme Court. If the Court of Appeal in 
Giambrone had concluded that the transaction was completed because the 
monies had been released in return for a guarantee – just as in AIB the monies 
were released in return for a charge – then the loss should have been assessed 
by contrasting the purchasers’ position with the guarantees actually received 
against the position they would have been in with the proper guarantees. On that 
basis, no loss would have been suffered by the purchasers. 
In any event, the Court of Appeal thought that compensation at common 
law would be subject to the SAAMCO principle, and held that equitable 
compensation should also be subject to the same restriction (at [64]). This 
assimilation of SAAMCO into the equitable sphere follows logically from the 
decision of the Supreme Court in AIB that equitable compensation is focussed 
on loss in a similar manner to compensation at common law. Yet given the 
difficulties that courts have faced in applying the SAAMCO principle, it is to be 
expected that it will be a further source of difficulty when dealing with 
equitable compensation. Indeed, the SAAMCO principle does not even seem 
very helpful when considering the breach of the custodial duty at issue in 
Giambrone; Jackson L.J. thought (at [84]) that the purchasers suffered a “direct 
loss” as a result of this breach, and the very purpose of the custodial duty was 
not to pay the money away without receiving appropriate guarantees. As a 
result, there should be no “cap” on liability as a result of the SAAMCO 
principle.  
However, Jackson L.J. did consider fully the impact of SAAMCO on a 
claim for equitable compensation “[i]f and in so far as the claimants’ claims rest 
upon negligent information or advice” (at [83]). In South Australia Asset 
Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191 at 214 Lord 
Hoffmann drew a distinction between cases where a party is under a duty “to 
provide information for the purpose of enabling someone else to decide upon a 
course of action and a duty to advise someone as to what course of action he 
should take”. But the division between “information” and “advice” can be 
misleading. Jackson L.J. preferred to differentiate (at [75]) between “(1) cases 
where D is liable for the specific consequences of its information or advice 
being negligently wrong and (2) cases where D is liable for all the consequences 
flowing from C entering into a transaction in reliance on D’s negligent advice”. 
Solicitors generally fall within category 1, since they only provide part of the 
material on which the client bases its decision. This point was forcefully made 
very recently by Lord Sumption in Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] 
UKSC 21, who criticised earlier cases (such as Bristol and West Building 
Society v Fancy & Jackson (a firm) [1997] 4 All ER 582 and Portman Building 
Society v Bevan Ashford (a firm)[2000] PNLR 344) which had held that 
solicitors fell within Category 2. Lord Sumption was clear that even though a 
breach of duty by a solicitor may be very grave indeed and crucial to the client’s 
going ahead with a transaction, that was insufficient to transform the case from 
Category 1 to Category 2. Solicitors “rarely supply more than a specific part of 
the material on which his client’s decision is based” (BPE at [44]). They are 
therefore very different from investment advisers who advise clients what to do 
with their money: such advisers will generally fall within Category 2. 
 As lawyers focussed on the legal aspects of the purchase of property, it is 
suggested that Giambrone ought to have fallen within Category 1. That would 
be consistent with the thrust of Lord Sumption’s reasoning in BPE. Yet Jackson 
LJ held that “this was not a conventional conveyancing situation” (at [82]) and 
therefore fell within Category 2, exposing Giambrone to liability to compensate 
for all the losses suffered by the claimants, rather than just the consequences of 
the information provided being wrong (which would have been nothing). The 
basis of this conclusion is flimsy. Jackson L.J. pointed out that the claimants 
were buying properties in Italy with no knowledge of Italian law, but even if the 
properties were in England it is not evident that many claimants would have 
much knowledge of English property law either. Nevertheless, his Lordship 
thought that Giambrone “were (albeit imperfectly) guiding the whole decision-
making process” (at [82]). It is not clear why he reached this conclusion; it does 
not seem unusual that the solicitors “were telling the clients what protection 
they needed, what sums they should pay out and when it was safe to pay those 
sums out” (also at [82]). His Lordship considered that Giambrone undertook 
“much wider obligations” (at [25]) than simply advising on legal aspects of the 
purchase – despite this restriction being stated by Giambrone in a letter to its 
clients – but simply referred vaguely to “documents quoted in paragraphs 21-
24” to justify this finding. Reading those documents, it seems clear that 
Giambrone was offering legal advice on legal aspects of the transaction, and no 
more than that. References to the “necessary due diligence” it undertook to 
carry out, and even to “a multiple object investigation aiming at determining the 
feasibility of the targeted purchase” should be read in that context: the focus of 
the lawyers was on the legal aspects of the transaction. 
 It is therefore suggested that the Court of Appeal was wrong to conclude 
that – to the extent that the claim rested upon negligent information or advice – 
this was a Category 2 rather than a Category 1 case. After all, Giambrone could 
not have advised on matters such as valuation of the properties, and that was 
clearly outside the scope of their duties. Moreover, they were only retained after 
the purchasers had paid the initial €3,000 and decided to purchase a particular 
property. As a result, it is difficult to see how Giambrone was in a similar 
position to the investment adviser who advises a client what to do with its 
money (taken as a typical case falling within Category 2). Jackson L.J. thought 
that, having taken the primary decision to buy property in southern Italy, the 
claimants “put themselves into the hands of Giambrone as their experienced 
Anglo-Italian lawyers” (at [83]), but this is no different from ordinary property 
transactions in the purely domestic context. 
 Superficially, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Giambrone looks 
unremarkable. Their Lordships apply the language of “equitable compensation” 
to remedies for breach of trust, rather than the traditional language of “account” 
and “falsification”, which is in line with AIB. And, given the focus on 
compensation, it is consistent to employ a “scope of duty” analysis and the 
SAAMCO principle. Yet the application of these notions to the facts is 
problematic, and is likely to continue to pose problems in future cases. It may 
be that the Court of Appeal was influenced by the merits of the case: Avvocato 
Giambrone, described by Jackson L.J. as “the moving force” (at [5]) in 
Giambrone, lost his entitlement to practise in England as a result of a decision 
of the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal following an investigation into 
misconduct relating to bulk conveyancing on behalf of clients purchasing 
properties abroad. However, it may be that the solicitors in Target also 
participated in the fraud perpetrated on the lender (see e.g. Target at 432) but 
that did not cloud the issues of legal principle on an application for summary 
judgment. Giambrone does not sit easily with the recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court in both AIB and BPE.  
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